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MERGERS AND PREVENTIVE ANTITRUST
POLICY
George J. Stigler t
A distinction may be drawn between two kinds of antitrust law,
the preventive and the corrective. The preventive seeks to outlaw
those forms of behavior which, if pursued far enough, reduce or elim-
inate competition. The corrective seeks to eliminate monopolistic
power already in existence, or at least to curb certain exercises of this
power. Undoubtedly, there are policies that fall on the borderline be-
tween these categories, but in general, the distinction can be made with
tolerable certainty.
Almost all of the American antitrust law is corrective. This need
not be argued for the Sherman Act, and I think that it is almost as true
of the Clayton Act. The latter's prohibitions upon price discrimination
and tying-clauses apparently were adopted in part to prevent the ap-
pearance or spread of monopoly, but it is evident that both types of
policies can arise only when monopoly power is already possessed. No
competitive seller will continually accept a lower price from some buyers
than he can get by diverting his goods to other buyers; ' and no buyer
with adequate alternative supply sources will accept the limitations im-
posed by tie-in sales or total requirements contracts without an off-
setting reduction in price. Section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 the anti-
merger section, is the only important instance of preventive antitrust
legislation.' I shall discuss this section after briefly discussing the
general problem of preventive antitrust policy.
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1. The widespread opposition to this view even among disinterested students has
impressed itself upon me in the course of the deliberations of the Attorney General's
National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws. A good deal of the opposition is
due to the fact that non-economists look only at the nominal price, whereas the
economist uses "price" to denote all the conditions of sale, including, e.g., the credit
rating of the buyer. Part of the opposition arises also from the perennial, and at
times perhaps deliberate, confusion between sporadic and systematic price dis-
crimination. The REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT) is not free from
this latter confusion. See REPORT at 218, 336.
2. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
3. Perhaps the FTC's mandate to eliminate unfair methods of competition works
in the same direction; but unfair methods of competition are probably at least as
pervasive among small businesses as large, and the common types of FTC cases have
only modest relevance to monopoly.
(176)
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PREVENTIVE ANTITRUST POLICY IN GENERAL
In the nature of things, a preventive antitrust policy cannot be
wide-flung. An antitrust policy is employed by a society which wishes
to use the competitive market, rather than powerful private or public
bodies, to regulate most economic activity. Many business activities
could lead to monopoly. Some, like innovation, are generally ap-
plauded; some, like advertising, have more equivocal reputations; and
some, like moving to low wage sections, are all too widely deplored.
If a society were to intervene in every activity which might possibly
lead to a reduction of competition, regulation would be ubiquitous and
the whole purpose of a public policy of competition would be frustrated.
The policy of competition rests upon the assumption that economic
forces will go far toward preserving a competitive economy, so that
only a moderate amount of preventive (and corrective) antitrust action
is necessary to achieve a tolerably satisfactory level of competition. This
assumption is today almost an American monopoly; most Europeans
believe that competition is self-destructive, and their confidence in this
belief has not been diminished by the enormous efforts they expend
in suppressing competition. But I accept the assumption as a funda-
mental empirical truth; the history of the American economy in the
twentieth century testifies that a modest program of combatting mo-
nopoly is enough to prevent any considerable decline in competition.
A preventive antitrust policy, therefore, should be directed at ac-
tivities which on their face have a general and important tendency to
reduce competition, and only at such activities. Mergers of business
rivals are unique in the degree to which they meet this requirement.
By definition, they involve at least a temporary reduction in the number
of independent enterprises in the industry. This is, indeed, their chief
purpose; historically the other purposes of mergers (of large firms)
have been incidental and unimportant.4 The control of mergers since
1890 would have given us an industrial structure substantially less
concentrated than that we now possess.
The only other type of business activity that seems to invite pre-
ventive antitrust policy is the cooperation of firms within an industry
-which is economically only an incomplete form of merger. But
here, in contrast with mergers, the difficulty is that there are many
justifiable as well as many unjustifiable forms of cooperation. When
an industry seeks to standardize its products or engages in joint re-
4. In recent times, the avoidance of taxes has become a significant force in bring-
ing about mergers. See Burris, LINTNER & CARY, EFFCs OF TAXATION: CoR-
poRATE MERGEaS (1951). Taxes, while often an inducement to sell a flourishing enter-
prise, are not the reason why the sale is made to a business rival.
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search or defends itself against attacks by other industries (e.g., mar-
garine v. butter), no antitrust questions need be raised. In fact, such
cooperation is almost identical from an economic viewpoint with pur-
chase of the activity from an outsider: the industry may collect its own
market information, or it may buy the information from a McGraw-
Hill publication. There appears to be no feasible distinction, from the
standpoint of preventive antitrust policy, between forms of cooperation
which may reduce competition if pursued far enough, and those which
will leave competition unimpaired.' The Attorney General's Com-
mittee is probably right in believing that each class, although not each
instance, of trade association activities should be judged separately.
6
In addition to these general types of preventive antitrust policy,
there are many ad hoc policies, most of which stem from the economic
activities of government. Thus the government plant disposal pro-
grams, the licensing of sequestered foreign patents, armed forces pro-
curement policy and sundry other government policies have paid some
attention to the preservation of competition. Very possibly the list
of such policies should be lengthened; for example, the vast research
expenditures of the Federal Government now go chiefly to large busi-
ness enterprises which are allowed to own the patents resulting from
the government-financed research, and it is not obvious that this scheme
pays adequate attention to competition and other social goals. But
these ad hoc policies raise fewer questions of principle than of fact,
and we shall not examine them here.
MERGERS
The amended section 7 of the Clayton Act is an untested part of
the antitrust laws, and thus poses an especially troublesome problem to
the antitrust agencies. They naturally fear to spell out in a concrete
and meaningful fashion the specific criteria of mergers which reduce
competition to an illegal extent. Lacking extensive experience in en-
forcement; they could easily devise criteria which have large and em-
barrassing loopholes, or alternatively, the criteria might prove obstruc-
tive of innocent and even desirable mergers. Considerations such as
these presumably explain, and possibly even justify in part, the evasive
action taken by the enforcement agencies when asked for criteria.
But such considerations do not dictate an equal measure of evasive-
ness by the Attorney General's Committee which, after all, was not
burdened with judicial authority or administrative powers. Yet the
5. Of course, one can distinguish certain forms of cooperation which immediately
reduce competition, but their control is part of corrective antitrust policy.
6. REP RT at 19-24.
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Report lists several pages of "factors" which should be taken into ac-
count in judging the legality of a merger; the following is a distressingly
representative sample of this listing:
"(a) What companies buy or sell in the market, how many,
and what are the significant differences among them: (i) large,
medium, and small (market shares, or rank of large companies,
etc.) ; (ii) degrees of vertical integration; (iii) uses of the prod-
uct; and (iv) the significance of the product under study in the
output or in the purchases of different companies." 7
Ignoring the naked ambiguity of some phrases such as (iii), it will be
observed that nothing is said of how these factors work. For ex-
ample, there is no hint as to whether the presence of large buyers or
the existence of vertical integration serves to make an otherwise de-
batable merger more or less objectionable.
It is one thing to recognize that there will necessarily be some
difficult and puzzling borderline cases in the enforcement of the new
section 7; it is another and very different thing to assume that one must
approach the interpretation and enforcement of the section in a purely
ad hoc manner. We should not entrust the administration of general
statutes to enforcement agencies with the lonesome admonition that
they should act in the public interest. I propose to discuss some pos-
sible criteria and problems in the enforcement of the anti-merger sec-
tion.
Horizontal Mergers
Much discussion of section 7 implicitly seems to assume that its
chief applicability will be to the firm that engages in a succession of
mergers, each raising its share of the industry's output by a fairly
small percentage. The question of the effect of any one merger on
competition then becomes: which straw breaks a camel's back? This
is a real problem,' but surely its importance is much exaggerated. Often
a single merger will substantially reduce competition: some camels try
to haul pianos.
The elimination of mergers which certainly or almost certainly
reduce competition by a very substantial am6unt may, in fact, prove to
be the chief contribution of the new section 7. Many of these mergers
would be within the reach of the Sherman Act, it is true, but the less
exacting standards of the Clayton Act will greatly simplify the task of
prohibiting such mergers. Moreover the amended section 7 will serve
7. Id. at 126.
8. See pp. 180-83 infra.
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as a prod to the Department of Justice, which has almost completely
ignored the task of enforcing the Sherman Act prohibitions of uncon-
summated attempts to monopolize.9
The most difficult task in devising criteria of the applicability of
section 7, however, arises for the mergers which are not sufficiently
large relative to their industries as to become probable or palpable Sher-
man Act cases. Here one can proceed along two very different, but
not inconsistent, lines.
The first line employs a legal criterion. If, in the industry, there
have been significant instances of conspiracy or attempted conspiracy
in restraint of trade, then any merger of two or more firms of sub-
stantial size should be forbidden. A conspiracy to restrain trade is
easier to form, and more effective in its operation, if the firms in an
industry are fewer and the leading firms are larger. A past record
of conspiracy shows that the number is already too small, or the rela-
tive size of some firms is already too great, to allow a further weaken-
ing of the forces of competition.
This criterion of monopolistic history is very powerful; it dictates,
for example, that there should be no mergers by the larger companies
in steel and cement which have records of conspiracy through basing
point price systems. It dictates that there should be no mergers in
industries characterized by frequent antitrust violations, such as various
kinds of electric lamps and lights, movie exhibition and abrasives. Only
if the attempts at conspiracy were absurd and unrealistic gestures,
condemned in advance by market realities, could one dismiss this sort
of proof of present or incipient overconcentration within an industry.
The second line of analysis is more directly economic. The basic
test of an undesirable merger is that, if the merging firm continues this
type of merger activity, competition will be appreciably reduced. It
requires only a moment's thought to reveal that this basic test is not
easily translated into objective and manageable criteria. Even a low
rate of merger, if continued long enough, may lead to high c6ncentra-
tion and reduce competition substantially. If the merging firm begins
to raise prices, often other firms will be attracted to the industry, so
should one not also predict the rate of entry of new firms? Aside from
questions of fact about the history of mergers and entry of firms-which
can be troublesome enough, of course-we must make decisions as to
(i) what a critical level of concentration may be; (ii) the time horizon
we employ; and (iii) what may be the costs of excessive zeal in com-
batting mergers.
9. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
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The level of concentration which seriously threatens competition
still eludes precise determination by the economist. We all recognize
that in a properly defined industry, if the largest firm has less than ten
per cent of the output, competition will be effective-in the absence of
collusion which itself generally will be less probable and effective when
concentration is low. And when one firm has forty or fifty per cent or
more, or two to five firms have seventy-five per cent or more of the
industry's output, competition will seldom plague the industry. Between
such widely separated limits, the level of concentration which poses
a serious threat to competition will vary with the ease with which new
firms can enter the industry, the rate of growth of the industry, the
closeness of substitute products made by other industries and their
competitive organization and other factors.
To this area of uncertainty, one must add that of the time period
over which we should extrapolate the recent trends of concentration. If
we use a very long period, almost all mergers are suspect; if we use a
very short period, we are simply discussing a single merger and thus
ignoring the possibility that the reduction of competition may be a
process as well as an event. But this is really a minor problem, I con-
jecture. Firms which are seeking a commanding position in their
industry move swiftly as a rule, and a very few years-say five-should
usually be sufficient to reveal their plans.
We cannot prohibit all classes of mergers which might conceivably
reduce competition without interfering with legitimate and desirable
mergers which have no adverse effect, or only a negligible effect, upon
competition. Moreover, it is necessary to recognize the possibility that
some mergers which raise concentration or reduce an already small
number of firms may increase competition. This situation may arise
when the small firms in an industry are relatively inefficient and cannot
survive as independent enterprises; if they can survive by merging,
the number of effective competitors in the industry is increased.10 The
recent mergers of the small firms in the automobile industry were pre-
sumably tacitly approved by the antitrust agencies on this line of think-
ing, and conceivably properly so.
Those mergers which increase both concentration and competition
are most uncommon, however. In industries where one must produce
10. The Report mentions two other types of mergers which may serve desirable
ends. First, ". . . mergers may ease from the market companies which have failed
in the competitive struggle and thus prevent potential bankruptcies." REPoRT at 124.
It is not explained why the acquiring firm should pay more than a bankruptcy price,
unless it is also acquiring some market control. Second, ". . . [mergers] may spur
operating economies by spreading overhead costs. . . ." Id. at 125. This is simply
inaccurate arithmetic; the merged firm has the sum of the overhead costs of the con-
stituent firms and presumably no greater output. In any case, spreading--or piling
up--overhead costs is no spur--or bridle-to operating economies.
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a fifth or more of the nation's output in order to achieve an efficient or
profitable productive technique, competition will be weak whether one
does or does not allow mergers. If the economies of scale are not sub-
stantial, the proper social policy would be to dissolve the giant firms
rather than to allow mergers of the small; if the economies of scale are
substantial, then competition cannot be used to regulate the industry.
Proposals for the enforcement of the anti-merger statute should
also take into account the practical limitations on the investigations
that the enforcement agencies can make. It would be absurd to expect
a thorough investigation of each of the hundreds or thousands of mer-
gers of interstate commerce dimensions that occur each year. One
must eliminate the vast majority of mergers from review, but the elim-
ination should be made on the basis of presumptive legality and eco-
nomic unimportance, and not-presumably, as at present-on the
basis of the caprice of notoriety.
I should think that the foregoing considerations are best met by
a set of rules such as these:
1. There should be a presumption that every firm with less than
five to ten per cent of an industry's output (after merger) may
engage in the merger. Within this range, the percentage should
be lower, the larger the industry.
2. Every merger by a firm which possesses one-fifth or more of
an industry's output after the merger shall be presumed to
violate the statute."
3. In the situations that lie between these limits, the merger should
be investigated by the enforcement agencies if the aggregate
annual sales of the merging firms will exceed some absolute
level-say five million dollars-after merger.- Its legality
should be judged along the lines discussed above.
A set of rules such as these would serve the double purpose of giving
the business community some advance knowledge of public policy
toward most mergers, and of achieving the important goals of the
legislation.
11. It is interesting to notice that in the recent complaint against Schenley Indus-
tries, Inc., for acquiring control of Park & Tilford, the merged firm is near this
borderline of one-fifth. The merged firm would have 20.5% of productive capacity,
26% of production, 17% of bottled whisky, 19% of storage capacity, 22% of in-
ventories and 19% of dollar volume of sales, according to the complaint. United
States v. Schenley Industries, Inc., Civil No. 1686, D. Del., Feb. 14, 1955.
12. Such a cut-off point has economic as well as administrative justification. A
monopolist of small absolute size will normally be encroached upon by new rivals
much sooner than a monopolist of large absolute size. See my introduction to
BusixEss CoNCENTRATIoN AND PRICE PoucY (1955).
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Vertical Integration
The foregoing discussion pertains only to horizontal mergers,
i.e., mergers of firms within the same industrial category. Both the
Report and the literature of antitrust have devoted considerable at-
tention to two other categories of mergers: the vertical integration of
enterprises, and the conglomerate firm.
It is not obvious that the vertical merger has any direct antitrust
relevance. Suppose that there are one hundred firms (of reasonably
similar sizes) in each of the consecutive processes of spinning, weaving
and dyeing a particular textile. Each process will be competitively
organized.. Suppose that there is universal vertical integration, so that
instead of 300 firms, one hundred in each process, we now have one
hundred firms, each operating in all three stages. Why should not
all the processes still be competitive ?-we have just finished saying
that one hundred firms in any industry are sufficient for competition.
Except in empirically unimportant cases, there is no reason to expect
that vertical integration has any monopolistic implications so long as
every stage of production is competitive.18
Of course vertical integration loses its innocence if there is an
appreciable degree of market control at even one stage of the production
process. It becomes a possible weapon for the exclusion of new rivals
by increasing the capital requirements for entry into the combined in-
tegrated production processes, or it becomes a possible vehicle of price
discrimination.' In these cases new vertical mergers are not desirable,
and one should supplement our rules with an additional one:
4. Where a firm has a fifth or more of an industry's output, its
acquisition of more than five to ten per cent of the output ca-
pacity of industries to which it sells or from which it buys in
appreciable quantities shall be presumed to violate the statute.
This rule is simply an adaptation of rules 1 and 2.
Conglomerate Mergers
Conglomerate mergers owe much of their current interest, and
perhaps their intellectual parentage, to Corwin Edwards, who has
portrayed them as a menacing but elusive form of organization. 1  The
13. The one probable effect upon competition is indirect. It may be true of
certain industries that the firms most likely to enter them are firms which sell to
or buy from them. Then vertical integration would reduce the number of potential
entrants, and in borderline cases (hence the empirical unimportance of the exceptions)
decrease somewhat the competition within a given stage of production.
14. See Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59
J. PoL. Ecox. 190-91 (1951).
15. See Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in Busitmss
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY (1955).
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essence of this type of firm, as I understand it, is that although the
firm need not have an appreciable degree of'market control in any
one market, yet because of the many markets in which it operates and
the large resources it possesses, a power is acquired to sell and buy
at preferential terms. I must confess that the exact mechanics by
which the total power possessed by the firm gets to be larger than the
sum of the parts (in individual markets) escape me, and I am not sure
that there are any companies that meet the specifications of the con-
glomerate firm. There is a certain resemblance between Edwards'
concept and the structure of, e.g., duPont, but duPont has monopoly
power in many markets, and therefore one does not have to resort
to conglomerateness to explain its power and prosperity.
If there are conglomerate firms, I suspect that their chief sins
are associated with their amassing of wealth. But the antitrust laws
are not the weapons with which to deal with non-monopolistic con-
centrations of wealth.
Patent Acquisition as Merger
The Report fails to mention in either the Merger or Patent
Chapters whether the acquisition of patents from a rival may be pre-
vented under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The control of mergers
should extend, of course, to the accumulation by one firm of any form
of property whose concentration of ownership will reduce competition
in an important market, and therefore it should extend to the accumu-
lation of patents. The Report mentions the Sherman Act as limiting
the accumulation of patents with intent to monopolize,1 but patents
of a rival are part of his "assets" and presumably subject also to the
Clayton Act's mandate against acquisition of "any part of the assets."
The ambiguous language of the Report seems to ask for a clearer
showing of impairment of competition in the case of patent acquisition
than in the case of ordinary mergers, but no justification is given for
this priority of patent rights over antitrust objectives (which pervades
section v of the Report), and I doubt that one can be given.
The anti-merger statute, it is evident, is the fundamental element
of our preventive antitrust policy. It seems a conservative estimate
that fully one-half of the major cases which have been brought under
the Sherman Act have been necessary simply because we did not have
an effective anti-merger policy in the past. The antitrust agencies
should take this lesson to heart; the new statute deserves a place of
high priority in the antitrust policy of the United States.
16. REPoRT at 227 n.21.
